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Abstract
Many underlying relationships among multi-agent systems (MAS) in various
scenarios, especially agents working on dangerous, hazardous, and risky situations,
can be represented in terms of game theory. In adversarial environments, the
adversaries can be intentional or unintentional based on their needs and motivations.
Agents will adopt suitable decision-making strategies to maximize their current
needs and minimize their expected costs. In this paper, we propose a new network
model called Game-Theoretic Utility Tree (GUT) to achieve cooperative decision-
making for MAS in adversarial environments combining the core principles of
game theory, utility theory, and probabilistic graphical models. Through calculating
multi-level Game-Theoretic computation units, GUT can decompose high-level
strategies into executable lower levels. Then, we design Explorers and Monsters
Game to validate our model against a cooperative decision-making algorithm based
on the state-of-the-art QMIX approach. Also, we implement different predictive
models for MAS working with incomplete information to estimate adversaries’
state. Our experimental results demonstrate that the GUT significantly enhances
cooperation among MAS to successfully complete the assigned tasks with lower
costs and higher winning probabilities against adversaries.
1 Introduction
Natural systems have been the key inspirations in the design, study, and analysis of Multi-Agent
Systems (MAS) and Swarm Robotics [1, 2, 3, 4]. Cooperation in MAS can maximize global system
utility and guarantee sustainable development for each group member [5, 6]. Also, it is essential to
perceive the environment and recognize the threats and adversaries in the environment cooperatively
among all agents in the MAS team. An Adversary in the environment impairs the ability of the
individual agents and the MAS as a whole to achieve their global and local tasks [7, 8, 9].
Recently, researchers have been able to combine the disciplines of Robotics and adversarial MAS
into Adversarial Robotics focusing on autonomous agents operating in adversarial environments
[10, 11, 12, 7, 13]. Following the examples from Information Systems [14], we can classify an
adversary based on its needs and motivations into two general categories: intentional (such as an
enemy or intelligent opponent agent, which actively impairs the MAS needs and capabilities ) and
unintentional (like obstacles and weather, which might passively threaten MAS abilities) adversary.
In this paper, we refer to them as deliberate Monsters and accidental Obstacles, respectively.
Related Work Most of past and current research focus on the unintentional adversaries in the
environment, such as path planning avoiding static or dynamical obstacles, formation control avoiding
collisions and so forth [15, 10, 11].
This is particularly applicable to urban search and rescue missions and robots deployed in disaster
environments. The agents are more concerned about unintentional threats such as radiation, clutters,
or natural forces such as wind, fire, rain, etc. [16].
On the other hand, there is little research done in studying confrontational strategies, preventive
control, and behaviors to mitigate intentional adversaries (or enemy agents). For instance, Lin [17]
examined the problem of defending patrol tasks against a sequential attack in a knowledgeable
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Figure 1: An illustrative game scenario where the paths to a
target of the Explorer agents are blocked by Monster agents.
Figure 2: Patrolling
Figure 3: Attacking
Figure 4: Defending
Figure 5: Circling
adversarial environment. Prorok [18] studied multi-robot privacy with an adversarial approach.
Sanghvi and Sycara [12] identified a swarm vulnerability and studied how an adversary takes
advantage of it. Paulos and Kumar [19] describe an architecture for training teams of identical agents
in a defense game. As we can see, most of these research focuses on the privacy or cyber-adversaries
rather than physical adversaries confronting the agents in a Spatio-temporal domain.
Cooperative decision-making among the agents1 is essential to address the threats posed by intentional
physical adversaries. This is similar to the multi-player pursuit and evasion game problem [20, 7, 21,
22]. Recent works include optimal evasion strategies and task allocation [23, 24, 25] and predictive
learning from agents’ behaviors [26]. However, it is more realistic and useful for the MAS to achieve
a given task with minimum cost while simultaneously considering the adversaries. Unfortunately, to
the best of our knowledge, none of the methods focus on this domain.
Contributions To address the gaps in the literature, we introduce a new network model called
Game-Theoretic Utility Tree (GUT) to achieve cooperative decision-making for MAS in adversarial
environments compromising both intentional and unintentional adversaries. GUT combines the
principles and merits of Game Theory [27, 28], Utility Theory [29, 30], Probabilistic Graphical
Model (PGM) [31, 32], and Tree Structure exploiting its hierarchy to mitigate the threats posed by
intentional adversarial agents. We also propose a simple but efficient algorithm called "Adapting The
Edge," which combines individual adapting behaviors and group cooperation together to tackle static
unintentional adversaries as well. To evaluate our method, we present a new Explorers and Monsters
Game domain (Fig. 1) to demonstrate the efficacy of our approach and analyze the performance of
explorers to reach their targets against the state-of-the-art QMIX [33] based decision models.
2 Problem Statement
In our Explorers and Monsters Game, there are n Explorers tasked to explore the environment
and collect rewards (reaching treasure locations ptr) in an uncertain environment and each agent
with the (health) HP cost hi(i ∈ n). There are m Monsters and k Obstacles distributed in the
environment. Explorers i (i ∈ n) and Monsters j (j ∈ m) have strategy space Sei(s1, s2, ..., sp) and
Smj (s1, s2, ..., sq), p, q ∈ Z+,, respectively. Every strategy has corresponding actions to execute
s(at1, at2, ..., atr), r ∈ Z+. Monsters will adopt (known) strategies that reduces the HP cost of the
Explorers. Supposing the group of explorer’s successful possibility (win rate) getting the treasure is
W , our problem can be described as finding a suitable strategy for explorers Se in the solution space
under the premise of maximizing the W to minimize the explorer group’s HP cost, formulated as:
arg max
Se
W (Se|Sm, k, ptr);
subject to min
n,m∑
i=1,j=1
hi(Sei |Smj , k, ptr).
(1)
1We use the terms Agents and Robots interchangeably. For more related work, see Appendix. A.
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3 GUT Approach Overview
We introduce Game-Theoretic Utility Tree (GUT) (see Fig. 6), a new network for solving the Explorers
and Monsters Game through cooperative decision-making of Explorers in adversarial environments.
In each level, GUT distributes various Game-Theoretic Computation Units (see Appendix. B for
more information), which combines agents’ tactics in the current condition, the possibility of the
previous condition, and relative environment’s information. It also provides different Utility Function
to quantify related agents’ needs. Through calculating the Game-Theoretic Computation Unit, an
individual agent can get the corresponding possibility for all the solutions in the current unit. Then, it
will iterate this process until it computes the leaf units at the lowest level. According to the PGM
and relative Maximum A Posterior (MAP) theory [31], an agent can always find a suitable solution
set with a maximum joint probability in the entire solution space. This allows GUT decompose
high-level strategies into executable lower levels.
In our Explorers and Monsters Game, we build a three-level GUT to elaborate it. The first level
(high-level) determines whether or not attacking (or defending). The second level is to figure out the
specific agent to be attacked (or defended). The third level (lowest level) decides how the agents
should group themselves to adapt to the current situation.
Figure 6: General Individual Robot’s GUT
More specifically, in the first level we
define Explorers and Monsters both
have two strategies: Attack and De-
fend, which are represented through
Triangle (Fig. 3) and Regular Poly-
gon (Fig. 4) formation shapes, re-
spectively. According to the payoff
matrix (Table. 1) in a zero-sum game,
they can calculate the strategy which
can fit the current situation. Based
on the precondition in the first level,
they need to decide attacking or to
defend against the specific Monster
agent. For example, we assume that
in the attacking model, Explorers and
Monsters have two kinds of behaviors:
attacking the nearest agent or the attacking the agent with the lowest or the lowest ability in the
formation. Similarly, the defending model also can choose to defend against the nearest agent or
based on the opponents attacking ability. Through the payoff matrix in Table. 2, they can confirm the
target sequence. Finally, in the lowest level, with the tactics payoff matrix in Table. 3, individuals can
calculate the final tactics, such as the number of groups in Explorers and the behavior of following
others or not in Monsters.
Through this process, we decompose the individual agent’s strategy into three levels, and each level
focuses on different utilities corresponding to different needs or requirements. In order to simplify
this calculation process, across every level, we respectively use Winning probability (W ), the relative
expected cost of energy (E(e)) and HP (health power) (E(hp)) – the expected utility difference
of both sides – to measure every level’s utility. In the first level, the utility presents the Winning
probability, which relates to the current perceived adversaries’ number and individual attacking and
defending ability. In the second level, we consider the relative expected energy cost to describe this
level’s utility, which depends on the agents’ distribution and numbers. In the lowest level, we use
the relative expected HP cost representing the utility caused by the individual and group’s current
information, such as the number of groups and agent’s current energy level.
For the unintentional adversaries, we design the Adapting The Edge algorithm, which can help
individual agents tackling static unintentional adversaries and adapting their edge’s trajectory until it
finds a suitable route to the goal point. In this process, through the communication and information
sharing with other agents, an individual can select the direction having less possibility of a potential
collision with the unintentional adversaries to move. In our scenarios, the two mountains represent
the unintentional adversaries, and explorers need to find a path passing through them.
In this game, the Explorer’s group into Patrol Formation (see Fig. 2) to detect the unknown world
at the beginning, through tackling various threats in the past, they will select the shortest path to
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MB
Utility EB
Attack Defend
Attack WAA WDA
Defend WAD WDD
Table 1: Level 1 (Attack/Defend)- Explorer
& Monster Tactics Payoff Matrix.
MB
Utility EB
Nearest A Lowest A Highest
Nearest E(e)NN E(e)ALN E(e)AHN
A Lowest E(e)NAL E(e)ALAL E(e)AHAL
A Highest E(e)NAH E(e)ALAH E(e)AHAH )
Table 2: Level 2 (Who to Attack/Defend)-
Explorer & Monster Tactics Payoff Matrix.
MB
Utility EB
One Group Two Group Three Group
Independent E(hp)1I E(hp)2I E(hp)3I
Dependent E(hp)1D E(hp)2D E(hp)3D
Table 3: Level 3 (How to Attack/Defend) -
Explorer & Monster Tactics Payoff Matrix.
Algorithm 1: Explorer’s Collective Strategy Using GUT
Model in Explorers and Monsters Game.
Input: Explorers’ and Monsters’ states
Output: formation shape s; current attacking target t; number of
groups g.
1 set state = ”level one”;
2 while the changing of Monster’s number == True And Monster’s
number != 0 do
3 if state==”level one” then
4 Compute the Nash Equilibrium;
5 Get the most feasible formation shape s;
6 state = ”level two”
7 else if state==”level two” And s != Null then
8 Compute the Nash Equilibrium;
9 Get the most feasible attacking target t;
10 state = ”level three”
11 else if state==”level three” And s, t != Null then
12 Compute the Nash Equilibrium;
13 Get the most feasible number of groups g;
14 if Monster’s number == 0 then
15 s = ”Patrol”;
16 g = 1;
17 return s, t, g
the treasure (Fig. 5). In the whole process, explorers present a kind of global behaviors performing
Collective Rationality and caring about Group interest. In contrast, each Monster shows Self-interest
and does not cooperate with other Monsters.
4 Formalization and Algorithms
In this section, through formalizing Robot’s Need Hierarchy involving basic, safety, and capability
needs (see Appendix. C for formalization of needs), we can define the adversary and formalize the
decision process of intentional and unintentional adversaries in our Explorers and Monsters Game.
Definition 1 (Adversary). For certain state s1 ∈ S and a group of agents R1 given the action series a1i
∈ A fulfilling task T. Supposing without any interruption the maximum teaming needs is max(N1(s1,
a1i)). Considering another groups agents R2 involving with reaction series a2k. With interruption by
R2, group R1’s need is max(N12(s12, a1j)). If Eq. (2) is satisfied, it can be defined R2 an Adversary
to R1. In additional, if R2’s corresponding expected needs when facing R1 (N21) is not equal to R2’s
current needs (N2), then R2 will be regarded as Intentional Adversary (Eq. (3)). Otherwise, we
consider R2 as Unintentional Adversary (Eq. (4)).
max(N1(s1, a1i)) > max(N12(s12, a1j)), i, j, k ∈ Z+; (2)
E(N21|s21, a2k) 6= N2; (3)
E(N21|s21, a2k) = N2. (4)
4.1 Intentional Adversaries Decision
Theorem 1 (GUT Decision). For n level GUT, group A and intentional adversaries B have corre-
sponding zero-sum game Gi(A,B;Nti), i ∈ n (Fig. 6). Through computing the Nash Equilibrium of Gi
in each level, A has at least one dominant strategy series (s1, s2, ... , sn) in GUT.
Proof. see Appendix. D.1
Below we also can guarantee an n levels GUT having the Maximum A Posterior (MAP).
Corollary 1 (GUT MAP). Supposing the joint probability of a GUT is P(x) = P(x1, x2, ... , xn), there
is unique x∗ that maximize:
x∗ = arg max
x∈V al(x)
P (x) (5)
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Figure 7: Illustration of "Adapt The Edge" algo-
rithm for tackling (unintentional) obstacles.
Algorithm 2: Adapting The Edge
Input: Explorers’ and Mountains’ states
Output: moving direction r and distance ∆d
1 while The nearest collision point c ! = Null do
2 calculate the number n and m of non-collision agents
in both side of the line l passing through c and
perpendicular c’s tangent;
3 if n > m then
4 r = n side in line l;
5 ∆d = one step of agent’s movement;
6 else if n == m then
7 agent stop;
8 else if n < m then
9 r = m side in line l;
10 ∆d = one step of agent’s movement;
11 return r = current position to goal point, ∆d
Proof. see Appendix. D.2
The Utility Function is critical to the design to determine whether or not the agent can calculate
reasonable tactics. According to the discussion in Sec. 4 about the Explorers and Monsters Game, in
this step, we first assume each robot has two primary utility attributes: Energy Level and HP, then
analyze the three-level GUT from different needs perspective. See Appendix. D.3 for more analysis.
Through calculating the corresponding expected utility, agents can get the Nash Equilibrium [34, 35]
according to each level’s payoff matrix. After computing the entire GUT, it needs to combine each
level’s tactics and execute the integrated strategy in the planning level. Alg. 1 depicts the entire
decision process happening at the Explorers after they share information on their local environment.
4.2 Unintentional Adversaries Decision
When Explorers perceive the mountains (obstacles - static unintentional adversaries), they need to
utilize the limited information available among all agents by communicating the perceived information.
In our experiment, the scenario illustrated in Fig. 7. There are nine robots, and robots R4 and R5
detect the mountain. For robot R5, to avoid a collision, it needs to switch the current direction k to
tangent’s direction of the nearest collision point c. Since it has two directions, n and m, according to
R5’s state, it should select the direction n, which has more non-collision robots currently.
Specifically, considering the line L, which is vertical to a tangent through the point c, is the boundary.
For the direction n, there are five robots but only four robotsR1,R2,R3 andR6 do not have collision.
We also can see the non-collision robots’ number is three in the direction of m. So currently, R5
will select direction n to move certain distance ∆d, then adjust the direction to the goal point to
go forward and loop the entire process until it perceives no unintentional adversaries on its routing.
Combining the two kinds of decision, we present the entire decision process as Alg. 2. For simplicity,
we only select the maximum feasible solution at each level, entering the next level.
5 Evaluation through Simulations
Considering cross-platform, scalability, efficiency, and extendability of the simulation, we chose
“Unity” [36] game engine to simulate the Explorers and Monsters Game and selected Gamebit [37]
toolkit2 for calculating each level’s Nash Equilibrium. We evaluate GUT from two different perspec-
tives; Interaction Experiments to demonstrate the performance of Explorer’s cooperative strategies,
and Information Prediction to demonstrate the cooperation when the perception of Monster’s state is
not accurate, thus using predictive models.
In the entire experiments, we suppose each Explorer has the same energy and HP levels initially, and
every moving step will cost 0.015% energy. Also, every communication round and per time attacking
will cost 0.006% and 0.01% energy, respectively. If Explorer is being attacked by Monster, it will
2Gamebit is an open-source collection of tools for doing computation in game theory and can build, analyze,
and explore game models
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(a) Explorer Average HP Cost (b) Kill Per Monster - Explorer Lost (c) Kill Per Monster - HP Cost
Figure 8: The Performance of Interaction Experiments with Different Proportion in Corresponding Scenarios.
cost 0.15% HP per time. For the Monster, per time attacking energy and per time attacked HP cost
are 0.03% and 0.05%, respectively.
5.1 Interaction Experiments
In this section, according to a cooperative decision-making algorithm based on the state-of-the-art
QMIX [33, 38], we design three kinds of cooperative styles against GUT in different interactive and
communication form as follow (for relative definition and experimental settings, see Appendix. E):
QMIX [Partial Cooperation + Partial Communication] QMIX [33] is a state-of-the-art value-based
method applied to reinforcement learning in MAS. Here, we only focus on the decision making part
of QMIX, which considers the global benefit yielding the same result as a set of individual rewards.
This allows each agent to participate in a decentralized execution solely by choosing greedy actions
for its rewards. Accordingly, we assume that each Explorer can cooperate, communicate, and share
information with its perceiving explorers. Then based on the number of its observing explorers and
monsters, it will calculate its winning rate to select attacking or defending the hp lowest Monsters.
QMIXGUT [Noncooperation + Partial Communication] In this situation, individual Explorer using
GUT computes the winning utility based on its perceiving and partial communication information as
above discussion. However, they do not get the consistency to attack the specific Monster or defend.
GUT [Full Cooperation (collective Rationality) + Full Communication] For our architecture, we
assume each Explorer working in a full communication mode, which means that every group member
can share its information. Then through the GUT calculating and decomposing their strategies to
executable level, they finally get a consistent decision in the distributed system.
In these experiments, we do not involve unintentional adversaries Fig. 9 and consider three different
proportion (M/E) between monster and explorer as follow: 20 explorers vs 30 monsters, 25 explorers
vs 25 monsters and 30 explorers vs 20 monsters. In this experiment, we do not involve the Uninten-
tional Adversary(obstacles) and assume that explorers can get monsters’ current state if they perceive
them. For each scenario, we conduct ten simulation trials for each proportion in same environment
setting. Fig. 8 shows three scenarios’ results with different proportion. In this experiment, GUT
had the best performance compared with other cases. The QMIX and QMIXGUT have the similar
explorer average HP cost results in Fig. 8(a), but in Fig. 8(b) num. of explorers lost for killing a
monster and Fig. 8(c) HP cost for killing a monster, the QMIX has some advantage comparing with
QMIXGUT . In the winning rate comparison Table. 4, it also reflects the similar result.
Through this experiment, it does not only show that cooperation can conduce to decrease the cost
or increase the benefits in MAS but also contribute to overcoming the more challenging task. More
importantly, GUT help agents represent more complex group behaviors and strategies, such as
forming various shapes, separating different groups, to adapt the dynamically changing environment
in MAS cooperation, which mainly improves the system performance.
From another perspective, communication plays an important role when agents solve the conflict and
have an agreement in cooperation [13]. For the QMIXGUT and QMIX, each explorer communication
information pattern includes small data such as the number of its observing explorers and monsters
corresponding to the naive behaviors attacking or defending Monster directly. However, for GUT ,
the communication data is more comprehensive, aiding the agents to build a complex relationship of
situation and action spaces at each level, then choose a suitable tactic combination to adapt it.
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Figure 9: Only Intentional Adversary.
PRD
Winning Rate APP
QMIXGUT QMIX GUT
20e vs 30m 40% 50% 70%
25e vs 25m 90% 100% 100%
30e vs 20m 100% 100% 100%
Table 4: Winning Rate Comparison.
Ra
Com Incom L Incom Poly
WR Cse/w Cshp/w WR Cse/w Cshp/w WR Cse/w Cshp/w
With Intentional Adversary
20:30 70% 1077.37 2649.80 30% 2367.14 6306.90 30% 2726.64 6216.44
20:25 90% 818.63 2027.98 50% 1414.84 3807.23 40% 1375.83 4824.64
25:25 100% 1211.09 1772.00 90% 1432.06 2606.12 80% 1789.15 2949.89
25:20 100% 1414.35 1739.78 100% 1449.07 1960.45 100% 1472.46 2177.52
30:20 100% 1608.18 2241.09 100% 2041.85 2370.76 100% 1961.86 2271.48
With Unintentional Adversary and Intentional Adversary
25:25 100% 1443.85 2110.91 70% 2144.10 3143.63 60% 2451.37 3742.98
Table 5: System Utility Comparison. Ra: Ratio of Explorers
to Monsters, WR: Winning Rate, Cse/w: system average
energy cost winning a round, Cshp/w: system average HP
cost winning a round.
(a) Explorer Average HP Cost (b) Kill Per Monster - Explorer Lost (c) Kill Per Monster - HP Cost
Figure 10: The Individual Explorer’s Performance with Different Predictive Models Only Intentional Adversary.
Generally speaking, like a neural network, GUT involves the Game-Theoretic Computation Units
distributed at each level. Through the previous level’s output as an input and combining with current
information, at this layer, agents will calculate several game units based on corresponding to action
space with some possibility. Iterating this process in the entire network, agents will decompose its
strategy into several executable levels, then select the most probable tactic set to execute.
5.2 Information Prediction
We design two kinds of scenarios to analyze the individual and system performance. One is Complete
Information, which means that if Explorer can perceive the adversary, it will know the opponent’s
status, such as unit attacking energy cost and energy level, and vice versa. The other is Incomplete
Information, and agents can not gain an opponent’s status and information when they perceive them.
Predictive Model For incomplete information, we implement two simple Machine Learning
prediction models Linear Regression and Polynomial Regression to estimate adversary’s relative
parameters as comparison.
We take regressors as individual HP cost to predict opponent unit attacking energy cost Euc and
agent’s current energy Eel. In the Linear Regression, we use agent’s unit HP cost and average system
HP cost to predict opponent unit attacking energy cost and energy level correspondingly. The model
can be presented as Formula Euc = HPuc × βuc0 + ε and Eel = 100−HPasc × βasc0 + ε. For the
Polynomial Regression situation, the models are shown as Euc = HP 2uc × βuc2 +HPuc × βuc1 + ε
and Eel = 100 − HP 2asc × βasc2 − HPasc × βasc1 + ε. Here, β is corresponding regression
coefficients(βuc0,1,2 = {0.08, 0.03, 0.0001}, βasc0,1,2 = {0.03, 0.0003, 0.00001}), ε presents the error
following the normal distribution N (0, 1).
a. Environments with only intentional adversary In this part, we consider five proportions of
Explorers and Monsters (M/E) distributing in the scenario randomly. For each model, we also conduct
ten trials for each rate with the same experimental setting. From an individual perspective, Fig. 10
shows that comparing with the result trend of Complete Information (ground truth), Linear Regression
model has more accuracy than Polynomial Regression model. From system perspective (Table. 5),
the winning rate and system average energy/HP cost also show a similar result.
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(a) Explorer Average HP Cost/w (b) Explorer Average Energy Cost/w (c) Explorer Average Loss/w
Figure 11: The Individual Performance with Different Predictive Models Considering Unintentional Adversary.
Through these experiments, we can notice that a suitable predictive model plays a vital role in
shrinking the difference between the final results and ground truth. In a more realistic scenario, agents
would be in an Incomplete Information scenario, so they need to estimate the opponent’s state from
indirect information in the adversarial environment. Besides, the predictive model’s parameters also
require to change according to different scenarios, which means that an agent needs to learn from its
or system performance and adapt parameters corresponding to the situation.
b. Environments with unintentional adversary In this setting, we consider a more complex
scenario (Fig. 1), which involves the unintentional adversary (obstacle) and monsters adopting the
QMIX to make their individual decision. We fix the number of Explorers (E=25) and Monsters
(M=25) and also conduct ten trails for each predictive model. Through the individual performance
shown in Figs. 11(a) and 11(b), we can notice that the individual average HP and energy cost winning
a round increases a lot when unintentional adversaries are involved. From the system perspective,
Fig. 11(c) shows that the entire group will lose more agents to win a game concerning about the
unintentional adversaries. Also, Table. 5 reveals that unintentional adversaries lead to a decrease
in the winning rate and an increase in the system cost with the same condition to win one game.
Whether this effect can be attributed to the unintentional adversary or the Monster’s QMIX strategy
needs to be investigated.
More importantly, comparing with the ground truth (complete info.), the linear regression model
presents higher accuracy (winning rate, individual and system cost) than the polynomial regression
model, which also adds evidence to our discussion above.
These experiments and evaluations show that the predictive model and parameter estimation are both
crucial problems in GUT. It not only involves suitable mathematical models but also needs to consider
various learning methods to improve the efficiency and accuracy of decision making concerning more
complex scenarios in MAS, which is an avenue for future work.
6 Conclusions
Our work introduces a new network model called GUT - Game-Theoretic Utility Tree to mimic an
intelligent agent decision process for achieving multi-agent cooperation in adversarial environments.
We define the Adversarial Environment from agent’s needs perspective and classify adversaries into
unintentional and intentional. GUT builds a hierarchical relationship between individual behaviors
and intentional adversaries and helps the entire MAS represent more complex cooperative behaviors
to adapt to various scenarios. Further, to tackle the static unintentional adversaries (obstacles), we
present the Adapting The Edge algorithm. Finally, we validate our approach through extensive
simulation experiments with a Explorers and Monsters Game design and compare GUT against a
cooperative decision-making algorithm based on the state-of-the-art QMIX approach. The results
demonstrate GUT’s high performance in enabling superior cooperation among multiple agents and
tackling both intentional and unintentional adversaries to achieve the global objectives.
GUT leaves room for improvements. For example, GUT can be upgraded to include structure learning
from different scenarios. We are also interested in designing appropriate utility functions, building
suitable predictive models, and optimizing parameters in our future work. Besides, implementing
GUT in real robots is also an interesting and challenging problem, which can help us to develop more
robust computation models for the entire system.
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7 Broader Impact
In this paper, the authors introduce GUT, a new network model for achieving cooperative decision-
making for multi-agent and multi-robot systems in adversarial environments.
GUT could be applied to a wide range of applications, including AI, defense, robotics, wireless
network, network security, differential privacy, computer vision and so forth. From MAS perspective,
the agents have to exhibit an awareness of the environment not only at an individual agent level
but also at a system level, where computational game theory provide useful examples of the study
in the area of machine behaviour [16, 39]. Our research could be used to build a Game-Theoretic
Utility Neural Networks, which establish a hierarchical relationship between individual behaviours
and environmental information and help the entire system representing more complex cooperative
behaviours to adapt to various scenarios.
While there will be important impacts resulting from the use of GUT in general, here we focus
on the impact of using our method to provide solutions for adversarial environments. There are
many benefits to using such a approach, such as increasing the integration in decision-planning
applications. This can help enhance cooperation among MAS to successfully complete the assigned
tasks with lower costs and higher winning probabilities against adversaries. The potential risks could
include: (i) inefficient network structure in the use of GUT could cause duplicate computations and
increase computation complexity which may lead to issues in time-critical applications; (ii) unsuitable
predictive models and parameters could increase the risk of uncertainty and error for its outputs; (iii)
in Multi-Robot System (MRS), the risk of network security will also play an important role.
We see opportunities for research applying GUT to beneficial purposes, such as using various learning
methods to optimize structure, integrating with the self-supervised reinforcement learning, improving
algorithmic efficiency and prediction accuracy. To mitigate the risks associated with network security,
we encourage research to understand the impacts of using GUT in particular real-world scenarios.
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Supplementary Material: A Game-Theoretic Utility Network for Cooperative
Multi-Agent Decisions in Adversarial Environments:
Due to size limitations, we have made available the supplementary video attachment to this paper,
demonstrating the experiments in the anonymized link at https://streamable.com/pngbe8.
A Related Work
Research in Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) in adversarial environments can be classified into four
main categories (task-wise): Adversarial Patrol [40]; Adversarial Coverage [10, 11]; Adversarial
Formation [15]; and Adversarial Navigation [41, 42, 43]. In most adversarial MAS literature, the
adversaries are not artificial intelligent agents [10, 11]. They might be a natural force like wind, fire,
rain, or other creatures’ aggressive behaviors. Accordingly, the solutions to these problems are path
planning avoiding static or dynamical obstacles, formation control avoiding collisions, and so forth
[15, 10, 11]. This is particularly applicable to urban search and rescue missions and robots deployed
in disaster environments, where the agents are more concerned about unintentional threats such as
radiation, clutters, or natural forces such as wind, fire, rain, etc. [16].
On the other hand, there is little research done in studying confrontational strategies, preventive
control, and behaviors to mitigate intentional adversaries (or enemy agents). For instance, Lin [17]
examined the problem of defending patrol tasks against a sequential attack in a knowledgeable
adversarial environment. Prorok [18] studied multi-robot privacy with an adversarial approach.
Sanghvi and Sycara [12] identified a swarm vulnerability and studied how an adversary takes
advantage of it. Paulos and Kumar [19] describe an architecture for training teams of identical agents
in a defense game. As we can see, most of these researches focus on privacy or cyber-adversaries
rather than physical adversaries confronting the agents in a Spatio-temporal domain.
Cooperative decision-making among the agents is essential to address the threats posed by intentional
physical adversaries. Current researches mainly focus on solving multi-player pursuit and evasion
game problem [20, 7, 21], which primarily deals with how to guide one or a group of pursuers to
catch one or a group of moving evaders [22, 25]. Recent works in this domain concentrate on optimal
evasion strategies and task allocation [23, 24] and predictive learning from agents’ behaviors [26].
From MAS perspective, existing cooperative decision making models including Markov decision
process (MDP) and its variants [44], game-theoretic methods, and swarm intelligence [16]. They
mostly involve using Reinforcement Learning (RL) and Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN) to
find optimal or sub-optimal action sequences based on current and previous states for achieving
independent or transferred learning of decision-making policies [33, 38].
Specifically, the QMIX [33] is a state-of-the-art deep multi-agent RL method that uses a multi-network
structure (consisting of a mixing network at the system level) for Q-learning of action policies. They
demonstrate that full factorization of value decomposition networks (VDN) is not necessary to be
able to extract decentralized policies that are entirely consistent with their centralized counterpart.
However, these approaches mainly concern about partial cooperation3 and do not consider deeper
cooperation among all the agents in the MAS to build complex cooperation strategies among agents.
To address these gaps, we propose a new network model called GUT for cooperative decision making
in MAS. To analyze our approach, we also build a more realistic testing domain - Explorers and
Monsters Game, which is to achieve a given task with minimum cost while simultaneously considering
the adversaries in the environment. Future extension of this game domain includes multiple targets
and multi-group Explorers and Monsters.
Like the neural network, GUT provides corresponding Game-Theoretic Computation Units distributed
in each level, which combines agents’ tactics in the current situation, the possibility of the previous
situation, and relative environment’s information. Furthermore, in this paper, we only compare with
the decision making part of QMIX since our current approach mainly relates to the cooperative
decision-making model in MAS. In future work, we will consider augmenting RL, RNN, or various
learning methods on top of GUT to be able to fully compare with other multi-agent RL methods,
including QMIX [33] and its superior variant MAVEN [38].
3See Sec. E for clarity on the definitions of full and partial cooperation among agents in MAS.
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B Game-Theoretic Computation Unit
Fig. 12 describes the structure of a specific Game-Theoretic Computation Unit in GUT. (a) is
the game-theoretic module. Through calculating the Nash Equilibrium based on the utility values
(u11, ..., unm) of corresponding tactics combination in this module, we can get the probability
(p1, ..., pnm) about every combination. Then, according to conditional probability module (b), we
can describe the probability of every current possible situation as (pi1, ..., pinm). After that, it will
move on to next units correspondingly.
Figure 12: Game-Theoretic Computation Unit
Here,
• pi−1 presents the previous situation probability;
• Si presents current game-theoretic state;
• sa presents the tactics space (sa1, ..., san) of agent or group a;
• sb presents the tactics space (sb1, ..., sbm) of agent or group b;
• pinm = (pnm|pi−1), i, n,m ∈ Z+.
C Robot’s Needs Hierarchy
In order to quantify the needs [13] of cooperative agents, from statistical perspective, we first
formalize the Robot’s Safety, Basic, Capability and Teaming Needs (Eq. (1). (2). (3). (4).) based on
corresponding expectation.
Safety Needs : Nsi =
si∑
i=1
Wi · P(Wi|P,C); (1)
Basic Needs : Nbi =
bi∑
i=1
Wi · P(Wi|P,C,Nsi); (2)
Capability Needs : Nci =
gi∑
i=1
Ai · P(Ai|T, P,Nbi); (3)
Teaming Needs : Nt =
n∑
i=1
Ui · P(Ui|P,C,Nci); (4)
Here,
• P and C represent the data of agent’s perception and communication separately;
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• T represents the task requirement solution space;
• Ui represents the Utility value of agent i in the group;
• W represents corresponding weights;
• A represents the level of agent’s each capability;
• bi represents the size of agent’s i’s basic needs solution space;
• si represents the size of agent’s i’s safety needs solution space;
• gi represents the size of agent’s i’s capability needs solution space;
• n represents the number of agents in the group (explorers or monsters).
In the first level, individual safety needs (Eq. (1)) can express as the safety expectation, which
can be calculated through its behaviours’ weight and corresponding safety possibility based on the
information of perception and communication. If individual safety needs goes beyond to a certain
level, it will calculate the basic needs (Eq. (2)) which also can be presented as basic expectation.
After fitting the basic needs, agent similarly can compute its capability needs (Eq. (3)) through the
capability expectation according to the task requirement and perception data.
Through above analysis, we combine Utility Theory to define the intelligent agent’s fourth level needs
– Teaming (Eq. (4)). These represent high level needs for intelligent agent and can be regarded as a
kind of motivations or requirements to cooperate with each other achieving some goals or tasks in
order to satisfy the individual or group’s certain expectation utilities. Furthermore, for the highest
(fifth) level needs – Learning, which can help the individual agent to achieve self-supervised learning
based on the learned experiences and lead to self-evolution of the whole system.
D Analysis and Proofs
D.1 GUT Decision
Theorem 1 (GUT Decision). For n-level GUT, group A and intentional adversaries B have corre-
sponding zero-sum game Gi={A,B;Nti}, i ∈ n. Through computing the Nash Equilibrium of Gi in
each level, A has at least one dominant strategy series (s1, s2, ... , sn) in GUT.
Proof. For n-level GUT, supposing game Gi in level i, the size of action space of group A (z agents)
and B are li and mi correspondingly. For the intentional decision, the zero-sum game Gi can be
described as Eq. (5):
Gi = {A,B;Nti}, i ∈ n; (5)
Based on the teaming needs (Eq. (4)), group A’s each GUT level Nti can be presented as Eq. (6).
Nti =
z∑
i=1
Ei(U) = (agk)li×mi , g ∈ li, k ∈ mi, j ∈ z; (6)
According to Nash’s Existence Theorem [27, 34], it guarantees the existence of a set of mixed
strategies (where a pure strategy is chosen at random, subject to some fixed probability) for finite, non-
cooperative games of two or more players in which no player can improve his payoff by unilaterally
changing strategy. So in every finite games has a Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium or a Mixed Strategy
Nash Equilibrium, and the process can be formalized as two steps:
a. Compute Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium
We can present agents’ utility matrix as Eq. (7):
a11 a12 · · · a1mi
a21 a22 · · · a2mi
...
...
. . .
...
ali1 ali2 · · · alimi
 (7)
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The row and column correspond to the utility of agent A and B separately. Through calculating
the minimum value list of each row and maximum value list of each column, we can compute the
maximum and minimum values of the two lists separately.
min
1≤k≤mi
max
1≤g≤li
agk = max
1≤g≤li
min
1≤k≤mi
agk (8)
If the two value satisfy the Eq. (8), we can get the level i Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium Eq. (9),
and corresponding game value Eq. (10).
PSNE = (Ag∗ , Bk∗); (9)
VGi = ag∗k∗ (10)
b. Compute Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
The tactics’ probability of agent A present as Eq. (11).
AX = (x1, x2, . . . , xli); xg ≥ 0, g = 1, 2, . . . , li;
li∑
g=1
xg = 1 (11)
Similarly, we also can conclude agent B’s tactics’ probability as Eq. (12).
BY = (y1, y2, . . . , ymi); yk ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, . . . ,mi;
mi∑
k=1
yk = 1 (12)
So we can define (X, Y) as Mixed Situation in certain status. Then, we can deduce the expected utility
of agent A and B Eq. (13) and (14) separately.
EA(X,Y ) =
li∑
g=1
mi∑
k=1
agkxgyk = E(X,Y ); (13)
EB(X,Y ) = −E(X,Y ) (14)
In the Game Gi = {A,B;Nti}, if we can get all the Mixed Tactics of agent A and B as Eq. (15) and
(16), we can deduct the G’s Mixed Expansion as Eq. (17). Then, if we can compute a tactic (X∗, Y ∗)
satisfying Eq. (18) and (19), we define this tactic is the optimal strategy in current state and the game
result is Eq. (20).
S∗A = AX; (15)
S∗B = BX; (16)
G∗i = {S∗A, S∗B ;E}; (17)
E(X∗, Y ) ≥ VsA ,∀ Y ∈ S∗A; (18)
E(X,Y ∗) ≤ VsB ,∀ X ∈ S∗B ; (19)
VSA = VGi = VSB (20)
As above discussion, we can express the GUT computation process as corresponding Probabilistic
Graphical Models [31] – Bayesian Network. Supposing each node is independent, so the total
number of nodes in GUT is N (Eq. (21)), and the current joint probability distribution of group A
in GUT can be represented as Eq. (22).
N = N1 +N2 + ...+Nn
= 1 + l1 ×m1 + (l1 × l2)× (m1 ×m2) + ...
+ (l1 × l1 × ...× ln−1)× (m1 ×m1 × ...×mn−1)
(21)
P(X) = P(X1, X1, ..., XN )
= P(X1)P(X2|X1)...P(XN |X1, X2, ..., XN−1)
= P(X1)P (X2|X1)...P(XN |XN−(l1×l2×...×ln−1)×(m1×m2×...×mn−1)),
=
∏
i
Pi(Xi|ParG(Xi)), i ∈ N
(22)
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Since Nash’s Existence Theorem guarantees that every game has at least one Nash equilibrium [35],
we get Eq. (23).
Pi(Xi) 6= 0 =⇒
∏
i
Pi(Xi|ParG(Xi)) = P(X) 6= 0 (23)
Low Bound: If the each level Nash Equilibrium calculation in GUT is the Pure Strategy Nash
Equilibrium, individual agent can obtain an unique tactic entering into the next level, which means
this tactic’s possibility is one hundred percent Eq. (24). We also can get corresponding dominant
strategy series (s1, s2, ... , sn) in GUT.
Pi(Xi) = 1 =⇒
∏
i
Pi(Xi|ParG(Xi)) = P(X) ≡ 1 (24)
D.2 GUT Maximum A Posterior (MAP)
Corollary 1 (GUT MAP). Supposing the joint probability of a GUT is P(x) = P(x1, x2, ... , xn), there
is unique x∗ that maximize:
x∗ = arg max
x∈V al(x)
P(x) (25)
Proof. We can simplify an n-level GUT as one link Bayesian Network Fig. 13, and get the factors
of product Eq. (26) (φxi are the intermediate factors). And the maximum joint probability of GUT
Decision is equal to get its maximum factors of product. Then through VE (Variable Elimination)
[31], we can get the MAP assignment of this GUT. The entire process has two steps: 1) Variable
elimination Eq. (27); 2) Tracing back to get a joint assignment (x∗1, x
∗
2, ... , x
∗
n) Eq. (28). Finally, we
can get MAP results of the GUT Eq. (25).
x1 x2 x3 ... ... xn
Figure 13: n-level GUT as one link Bayesian Network.
P(x) =
∏
i
Pi(xi|ParG(xi)) =
∏
xi
φxi =⇒ maxP(x) = max
∏
xi
φxi (26)
Variable Elimination :
if X ∈ Scope[φxi ] then max
X
(φxi , φxi+1) = φxi max
X
(φxi+1) =⇒
first elimination :
maxP(x) = max
x2,x3,...,xn
φx2φx3 ...φxn max
x1
φx1
second elimination :
maxP(x) = max
x3,x4,...,xn
φx3φx4 ...φxn max
x2
φx2τ1
... ...
(n)th elimination :
maxP(x) = max
xn
τn−1
(27)
Tracing Back :
x∗n = arg max
xn
ψn(xn)
x∗n−1 = arg max
xn−1
ψn(xn, xn−1)
... ...
x∗1 = arg max
x1
ψ1(xn, xn−1, ..., x1)
(28)
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Maximum A Posterior :
x∗ = (x∗1, x
∗
2, ..., x
∗
n) is the MAP assignment,
τn−1 is the probability of the most probable assignment.
(29)
D.3 The Needs in Explorers and Monsters Game
According to above discussion, we assume that Explorers and Monsters have the same speed to move
and Monster can not communicate with each other. See Sec. D.3.4 for the list of terms and notations
used in this subsection.
D.3.1 Winning Utility Expectation
In the first level, we consider using Winning Probability obeying Bernoulli Distribution calculates the
need based on its utility expectation Eq. (30).
W (tev, tmv, rev, rmv, n,m) = (a1
a2tev + a3rev
a4tmv + a5rmv
)
m
n ; (30)
D.3.2 Energy Utility Expectation
The second Level’s utility is described the relative expected energy cost as Eq. (31), (32), (33) and
(32). And we consider three parts of energy cost in the whole process: walking, attacking and
communication.
E(d, v, f, q, n,m, φe, φm) =
b0 + b1
∫ +∞
−∞
(n−m)ed(x)pd(x, d)dx+ b2(
+∞∑
i=1
neae(i, f)pam(j,mφm)
−
+∞∑
j=1
meam(j, q)pae(i, nφe)) + b3
+∞∑
w=1
nec(w)pc(w,
d
v
);
(31)
ed(x) = b11x; (32)
ea(x, y) = b12xy; (33)
ec(x) = b13x (34)
In the entire attack − defend process, the agent’s action distance, the times of attacks and be-
ing attacked and the communication times obey Normal Distribution, Poisson Distribution
separately. So we can describe their distribution function as Eq. (35), (36), (37) and (38).
pd(x, d) =
1√
2pi
e−
(x−d)2
2 ; (35)
pae(x, λe) =
e−λeλxe
x!
; (36)
pam(x, λm) =
e−λmλxm
x!
; (37)
pam(x,
d
v
) =
e−
d
v (dv )
x
x!
; (38)
Then we can simplify the Eq. (31) as Eq. (39).
E(d, v, f, q, n,m, φe, φm) = b0 + b1b11(n−m)d+ b2b12nm(fφm − qφe) + b3b13nd
v
; (39)
D.3.3 HP Utility Expectation
In the lowest level, we use the expected HP cost to explain the utility as Eq. (40), (41), (42) and (43).
H(k, te, tm, re, rm, g, φe, φm) =
c0 + c1(
+∞∑
i=1
kh(te, re, i)phm(i, φm)−
+∞∑
j=1
gh(tm, rm, j)phe(j, φe));
(40)
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h(x, y, z) = ρz(x+ y) (41)
te,m(ee,m) = γe,mee,m; (42)
re,m(ee,m) = δe,mee,m; (43)
phe(i, φe) and phm(j, φm) are similar to the Eq. (36) and (37) correspondingly. Through simplifying
the Eq. (40), we can get Eq. (44).
H(k, te, tm, re, rm, g, φe, φm) = c0 + c1ρ[kφmee(γe + δe)− gφeem(γm + δm)]; (44)
D.3.4 Terms used in Sec. D.3
• AT and BT present the action space of group A and B correspondingly;
• n and m present the number of Explorers and Monsters separately;
• d presents the group average distance between two opponents;
• v presents the agent’s velocity;
• i and j present the times of attacks and being attacked;
• w presents Explorers’ communication times;
• f and q present the unit attacking energy cost of both sides agents separately;
• tev and tmv present average attacking ability levels of both sides separately;
• rev and rmv present average defending ability levels of both sides separately;
• te and tm present specific agent’s attacking ability levels of both sides separately;
• re and rm present specific agent’s defending ability levels of both sides separately;
• φe and φm present individual agent’s size;
• k presents the number of Explorers’ attacking simultaneously;
• g presents the number of Monsters’ attacking simultaneously;
• a, b, c, ρ, γ and δ present corresponding coefficient;
• ee and em present the current energy level of Explorer and Monster;
• h presents the current HP level of agent;
• p presents the probability corresponding to the different section.
E Relative Definitions and Experimental Setting
In our experiments, we assume that the individual agent’s communication range is larger than the
sensing range. Every agent can always connect to at least one agent when it communicates (with an
assumption of connected communication graph).
Self-interest (Individual Rationality) Individual focuses on the needs and desires (interests) of
one’s self. From philosophical, psychological, and economic perspectives, it is the motivation for
intelligent agents to maximize their benefits from an individual’s perspective, which is also Individual
Rationality.
Group-interest (Collective Rationality) Comparing with Self-interest, individual pays more at-
tention about group members’ needs, on the other hand, it is Group-interest. Through communication
and negotiation, they finally get a consensus and agreement fulfilling a solution to maximizing the
entire group’s needs and rewards, which can be regarded as Collective Rationality.
Partial Communication An individual agent only communicates and shares information with
agents that are in its sensing range.
Full Communication In this status, agents always keep in touch with each other even when they
are not in the sensing range. So, the communication graph can be represented as a completely
connected graph, which means that every agent can directly share its information with every other
agent.
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Noncooperation Individual does not communicate with each other; it makes a decision only
depending on its perception and needs. In this situation, the agent only concerns its own benefits
representing Self-interest.
Partial Cooperation Based on the Partial Communication’s information, individuals only cooper-
ate with sensing group members to maximize their needs or minimize the cost.
Full Cooperation According to the Full Communication’s data, individual make decision based
on the Group-interest showing Collective Rationality.
E.1 Experiment Setting
Each interaction (trial) in the Explorers and Monsters Game last about 40 to 50 minutes in the
simulated experiments on a laptop with Intel i7 Processor, GeForce GTX 1050 Ti GPU, and 16GB
DDR4 RAM running the OS Ubuntu 18.04.
It is worth noting that the Monsters attacking capability is 3x the Explorers attacking capacity in all
the experiments to represent higher capabilities of Monsters (who act based on their self-interests) in
preventing the Explorers from their tasks. A video demonstration of the experiments showing sample
trials of Explorers and Monsters Game using GUT and QMIX is available at the anonymized link
https://streamable.com/pngbe8.
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